In this paper we study an important question for the game theory of two players, about essentiality of such games. The investigation is carried out in a particular case, in the class of games with quadratic payoff functions on a rectangle. The essentiality in two players' games means that by joining the two players in union, both players can get positive additions to guaranteed payoff. The essentiality of two players' games has not always occurred. Thus, the joining of the two players in union, in general, may be useful and sometimes (in case of absence of essentiality) useless. In applications, for example in analysis of the economic activities of firms or countries, the question of usefulness of the union acquires a lot of interest. In the general game theory, the question of essentiality of games is given a little attention at the moment. Apparently, this is due to the difficulty of this problem in the general case. Note that the games with quadratic payoff functions are frequently used in game theory for modeling different kinds of processes being investigated, for example, in mathematical economics.
Introduction
In game theory (see, for example [1] - [3] ) a lot of attention is given to N person cooperative game theory. In this paper we consider the two-player game from the point of view of the usefulness of joining the players in a union, in which the choice of strategies is made concertedly, with the aim of maximizing the payoff's sum of both players.
Problem formulation
We consider two-person game on the rectangle K = [p, q] × [r, s] (p < q, r < s). The payoff function of the 1st player is
where (x, y) ∈ K, a 1 , b 1 , c 1 , d 1 are arbitrary fixed non-zero numbers. The payoff function of the 2nd player is g(x, y) = a 2 x 2 + b 2 y 2 + c 2 x + d 2 y,
where (x, y) ∈ K, a 2 , b 2 , c 2 , d 2 are arbitrary fixed non-zero numbers. By selecting x ∈ [p, q] the first player strives to maximize his payoff f (x, y). By selecting y ∈ [r, s] the second player strives to maximize his payoff g(x, y). We will study the question of usefulness of joining the two players in a union, in which the choice of strategies is made concertedly, with the aim of maximizing the payoff's sum of both players. As we know from game theory (see, for example, [1] - [3] ) the first player can guarantee a payoff
if he selects a vector x 0 ∈ X from the condition
Similarly, the second player can guarantee a payoff
if he selects a vector y 0 ∈ Y from the condition
Generally speaking, from physical point of view, payoffs f (x, y), g(x, y) can be measured in different physical units. We shall assume that payoffs f (x, y), g(x, y) are measured in the same units (in economic applications, for example, payoffs f (x, y), g(x, y) are usually measured in monetary units). In this kind of assumption, the value f (x, y) + g(x, y) have also a physical sense. If both players are joined together in a union (coalition), then acting concertedly (i.e choosing a pair (x, y) in [p, q] × [r, s] concertedly), they can use the quantity
It is easy to prove that (see (3), (5))
If
the joining of the players in a union (coalition) is advantageous to both players, since the positive quantity
can be distributed in the form of positive additions to guaranteed payoffs γ 1 , γ 2 . How actually this distribution is reasonably to do, see, for example in [4] .
Solution of the problem
In this paper we will study the relations (8), (9) for one class of two-person games with quadratic payoff functions on the rectangle. Let
where
and respectively. The being investigated inequality (9) can be rewritten as
i.пїЅ
We consider separately the inequalities
Further, in considering the inequality (16), we have to calculate the maximum and minimum on the interval [p, q] of the quadratic function of the form h(x) = αx 2 + βx. For this we have:
On the basis of the above, we can obtain sufficient conditions for strict fulfillment of the inequality (15) for different values of a 1 and a 2 .
Case a
All members of the inequality (15) for a 1 > 0, a 2 > 0 can be calculated directly by using the formula (18) and (19):
Thus, the values of the terms of (16) We obtained the following results: the inegality (16) holds strictly for all a 1 > 0, a 2 > 0, except the cases:
3.2 Case a 1 < 0, a 2 < 0
All members of the inequality (15) for a 1 < 0, a 2 < 0 can be calculated directly by using the formula (20) and (21):
Thus, the values of the terms of (16) 
We obtained the following results: the inegality (16) holds strictly for all a 1 < 0, a 2 < 0, except the cases:
By using formulas (22), (23) and (27), we obtained the following results: the inegality (16) holds strictly for all a 1 > 0, a 2 < 0, a 1 + a 2 > 0, except the cases:
By using formulas (23), (25) and (27), we obtained the following results: the inegality (16) holds strictly for all a 1 > 0, a 2 < 0, a 1 + a 2 < 0, except the cases:
By using formulas (22), (24) and (26), we obtained the following results: the inegality (16) holds strictly for all a 1 < 0, a 2 > 0, a 1 + a 2 > 0, except the cases:
By using formulas (24), (25) and (26), we obtained the following results: the inegality (16) holds strictly for all a 1 < 0, a 2 > 0, a 1 + a 2 < 0, except the cases:
Thus, the inequality (16) is fulfilled in strict sense for all values of the coefficients, except the cases:
Reasoning analogously, it can be established that inequality (17) is fulfilled in strict sense for all values of the coefficients, except the cases
The obtained facts, make it easily possible to obtain in the considered game, the sufficient conditions of fulfillment of the strict inequality (15).
Conclusion
In this paper we have considered a general two-person game on the rectangle. We have selected cases, when the joining of the two players in a coalition (union) is useful from the point of view of increasing the guaranteed payoff. The obtained results are of interest to the cooperative game theory. They can be used, for example, as an illustrative material in reading the course of the game theory.
